Introduction
Modern societies have developed institutions such as official legal systems or private arbitration systems that are costly to set up, but able to enforce contracts or agreements between people. In many situations, these enforcement institutions play a central role in governing contractual relationships. This is despite the fact that the contracting parties have the choice of self-governance directly through the structure of their contract. Our objective is here to study the problem of choosing self-governance vs. governance through a third party.
Economic transactions within long-term relationships are carried out by self-interested parties only if there is mutual interest in continuing the relationship. All transactions must, therefore, incorporate proper incentives to ensure that all parties continue to participate over time. These incentives are usually costly in the sense that they make it necessary to deviate from transactions that are optimal for both agents from an ex ante point of view. It is here that institutions can improve upon welfare by providing third-party enforcement: Agents involved in a long-run relationship are free to choose whether to rely on such institutions rather than on incentives through the structure of their agreement.
To govern relationships, third-party institutions (such as the legal system) are costly to set up as well. In essence, these institutions offer a threat of punishment in the form of fines or physical harm (e.g., imprisonment) in response to contractual violations, but cannot force performance of the contract itself. Their efficacy is based upon the ability to credibly commit to inflicting punishment in an objective manner if necessary. Objectivity arises from equal access as well as equal treatment of the parties involved in a relationship, while enforcement is achieved through the threat rather then the application of punishment. In fact, a strong presence of third-party enforcement manifests itself mainly in the performance of contracts and the absence of actual employment of punishment. Third-party enforcement can then be interpreted as a costly technology that threatens to inflict punishment in case of contract violations, even though this view is abstracting from other important factors such as limited effectiveness, information problems or the incentives for these institutions.
Given that these institutions are available but costly to set up, the question then arises as to what extent it is optimal for people to base incentive structures on these institutions. Are commitment problems persistent in the sense that the parties of a relationship do not want to rely exclusively on these institutions? Does the importance of outside (i.e., third-party) enforcement change dynamically over time? If so, what are the fundamentals that shape the dynamic evolution? Our contribution is to provide answers to these questions by analyzing the optimal use of costly outside enforcement in a long-run relationship.
We study a dynamic risk sharing problem between two risk averse agents where commitment is a priori limited in the spirit of Kehoe and Levine [6] and Kocherlakota [7] . Each period the agents face idiosyncratic income shocks. From an ex ante point of view, it is then optimal to transfer income ex post from an agent with high income realization to an agent with low income realization. We assume, however, that both agents cannot commit to make transfers they have agreed upon ex ante: At any point in time, each agent can choose to renege on the transfer and leave the risk sharing arrangement. In our set-up, incentives for the agents to honor transfers can be provided in two ways. First, agents can use the structure of the risk sharing arrangement itself to provide these incentives. Specifically, an agent can be induced to make a transfer of resources today if she is promised more expected utility in the future. Second, agents can rely on a "punishment" technology: Each period they can invest part of the overall resources in this technology. If investment occurs, the technology allows one to punish any agent who decides not to honor the transfer. This threat of punishment yields -for a resource cost -enforcement of transfers.
We show that -as long as the technology has convex costs and no fixed costs -it is optimal to employ the technology whenever the transfers necessary to support first-best risk sharing are not incentive compatible. It is never optimal, however, to provide incentives exclusively via this technology: The agents will always rely upon varying future promised utility -or, equivalently, the consumption profile -over time. Commitment problems are then only partially mitigated by using the technology and, thus, are persistent in this sense.
This implies that the enforcement choice (as represented by the investment decision) depends on the sequence of income shocks. Therefore, the optimal choice of punishment is history-dependent and inherently a dynamic one. For the case of two possible income realizations, we show analytically and numerically that more resources are spent on punishment as the difference in promised utility for the agents increases. Hence, we exhibit a positive relationship between inequality in future promised utility -or the relative position of the agents -and the use of third-party enforcement. In the long run, when no first-best allocation is incentive compatible, promised future utility is then equalized irrespective of the initial level of inequality between agents.
Existing work on dynamic risk sharing with limited commitment 1 takes the lack of commitment as exogenously given and focuses exclusively on the effects of optimally designed incentives that arise within the risk sharing relationship. The structure of these incentives is well understood. Kocherlakota [7] characterizes efficient risk sharing by relying on reversion to autarky as the appropriate punishment if an agent reneges on a risk sharing arrangement: Autarky is a credible punishment in the sense that it characterizes the set of subgame-perfect allocations in bilateral risk sharing environments.
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More recently, Genicot and Ray [5] extend these results to a framework of risk sharing within coalitions of agents. This paper goes further than this existing literature by studying how agents choose optimally between internal incentives or incentives provided through 1 See for example Phelan [12] , Kocherlakota [7] , Alvarez and Jermann [1] and Ligon et al. [11] among others.
2 Gauthier et al. [4] show that optimally designed ex ante payments between agents can help reduce commitment problems. Ligon et al. [10] investigate the role of self-insurance in form of storage on the incentives to share risk over time.
enforcement by a third party from outside the relationship. Hence, we study per se the optimal degree of commitment within a risk sharing relationship.
Our research is related to the just emerging literature on contractual intermediaries.
Parallel to our approach, Dixit [3] outlines a theory of enforcement intermediaries. He focuses on the role of third party enforcement in achieving cooperative outcomes in a prisoner's dilemma framework with random matching. The intermediary is modelled close to our approach as a player that can inflict punishments on other players for some positive fee. Ramey and Watson [13] investigate the optimal form of contractual intermediation or conflict resolution in a repeated prisoner's dilemma. Whereas we take the outside enforcement as given and investigate its optimal use by the contracting parties, these authors concentrate on understanding the existing design of such intermediation.
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The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents the environment. In Section 3, we describe the optimal contracting problem and derive its recursive formulation. Section 4 characterizes the optimal contract and contains the main results. In Section 5, we present numerical examples concerning the optimal use of the punishment technology. Finally, Section 6 concludes by discussing our modelling choices and puts our contribution into a wider research context. All proofs appear in Appendix A, while Appendix B contains a formal analysis of a result discussed in Section 4.
Environment
Consider the following environment where time is discrete and indexed by t = 0, 1, . . . .
There are two infinitely lived agents i = 1, 2, who receive each period a stochastic 3 It is useful to distinguish our paper from Krasa and Villamil [9] who study a static investment problem with differential information, where enforcement of the financial contract is a decision problem for the lender. Enforcement of the contract is costly and the contracting parties will try to avoid it via renegotiating the original contract whenever the lender cannot commit to seek enforcement of its terms.
While studying the optimal form of the financial contract, the authors take the lack of commitment to be exogenous (i.e., not to be a choice variable). 
where β ∈ (0, 1) and E t expresses the expectation conditional on a history of shocks at date t. We assume that u is increasing, concave and twice continuously differentiable.
Furthermore, u is bounded from below with normalization u(0) = 0 and lim c→0 u (c) =
∞.
Since the agents are risk averse and face idiosyncratic income shocks, there is an incentive to share income risk. We assume, however, that enforcement of arrangements to share risk is limited in the following sense: Each period, after uncertainty in period t is resolved and the current endowment (y 1 t,s , y 2 t,s ) is known, an agent i can choose to remain in autarky forever. In this case, the agent will consume her endowment forever and will be excluded from future trade, thereby obtaining a utility of
where V aut expresses the future expected utility from autarky which is independent of the realized history of shocks. is defined to contain a single element. 4 Note that the severity of current and future punishment depends only on the level of d t , i.e., on the level of punishment in the period when an agent decides to switch to autarky. Hence, a level of punishment chosen in future periods has no influence on punishments for switching to autarky in earlier periods.
5 Third-party enforcement does then condition only on the fact whether contract violations occur or not. In the formulation chosen here neither the identity of the violator nor her particular situationsuch as current income -matters for outside enforcement.
Describing Optimal Allocations
Before formulating the problem that describes optimal risk sharing between the agents we introduce some terminology. An allocation (c
given by a consumption process for each agent and a process of punishment levels. An allocation is feasible if
An agent will switch to autarky for a given state s at time t if the continuation utility offered by an allocation is less than the value of autarky given the current level of punishment. Specifically, an agent i will honor the allocation if and only if
, s). and compact in the product topology. Next, let U be the set of joint utility levels that can be attained by an allocation in Γ and denote by U i the range of utility levels of consumer i that is consistent with some allocation in Γ. The following lemma establishes properties of the set of attainable utility levels. All proofs are relegated to the appendix.
Lemma 3.2.
U ⊂ IR
2 is compact. 6 Convexity follows from the concavity of u, the convexity of ψ and the fact that the ex post incentive compatibility constraints at t are linear in d t .
U i ⊂ IR is compact and
Proof. See Appendix.
A short remark concerning incentive feasibility is in place. The ex-post incentive compatibility constraint (4) compares the expected utility of an allocation with the utility obtain by choosing autarky forever and being punished by losing a fraction d t of current and future utility. Remarkably, it is neither specified who pays the costs ψ(d t )
if nobody reverts to autarky nor who pays the costs if some agent does.
As long as neither of the agents chooses autarky, the distribution of costs is irrelevant since for the utility attained by an allocation only the distribution of resources net of costs
matters. This implies that it is always possible to recover the costs for operating the punishment technology as long as the agents are participating. Of concern is then that, given an agent chooses autarky, it might be optimal for the other agent to choose autarky as well with the result that nobody would pay for the technology and it would not be feasible to operate the technology. When describing incentive feasible allocations this strategic interaction is, however, implicitly taken into account here since d t = 0 is always feasible.
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The concept of incentive feasibility allows us to define optimal allocations. An alloca-
there exists no other incentive feasible allocation that provides both agents with at least as much expected utility at period 0 and at least one of them with strictly more expected utility at period 0.
7 Indeed it is possible to make these arguments analytically precise at considerable costs of complication: one can motivate constraint (4) by identifying the set of incentive feasible allocations with the outcomes of a class of games formalizing repeated bargaining with voluntary participation where the distribution of costs among the agents is specified and non-participating agents do not have to bear any of the costs ex-post. This is achieved by establishing pay-off equivalence between the set of equilibria of all possible games and U, i.e. the set of utility levels attainable through incentive feasible allocations.
For details see Koeppl [8] .
Define V min ≡ min U i and V max ≡ max U i . We can then set up a modified Paretoproblem that describes optimal allocations taking into account incentive feasibility. De-
as the solution to the problem (SP):
The function V refers then to the maximum level of expected utility agent 1 can obtain for any incentive feasible utility level u 0 ∈ [V min , V max ] that must be guaranteed for agent 2. Provided V is well defined it is clearly decreasing, since any incentive feasible allocation atû 0 >û 0 is also incentive feasible atû 0 . Concavity of this function follows immediately from the convexity of ψ, the concavity of u and the fact that
is the maximum utility given u 0 . V is then also continuous and differentiable almost
everywhere. The next proposition shows that V is indeed well defined and strengthens some of these immediate results.
There is an interval
strictly decreasing and strictly concave.
We now restrict V to the subset [V , V ] of its domain where it is strictly decreasing. By
and V describes the Pareto-frontier. Hence, any solution of the problem (SP) for given u 0 ∈ [V , V ] is an optimal allocation. Since u is strictly concave, for every u 0 ∈ [V , V ] there exists a unique optimal allocation. Furthermore, for any solution of problem (SP) the promise keeping constraint is strictly binding; i.e.,
These facts allow us to use the methods introduced by Spear and Srivastava [15] and Thomas and Worrall [17] to formulate the problem (SP) recursively. The state variable for this approach is given by the level u 0 of promised utility for agent 2.
Definition 3.4. A contract is given by a collection of functions
A contract consists of functions that determine the current level of consumption and the future expected promised utility for agent 2 for each state s, denoted by c s and u s respectively, as well as the level of punishment, denoted by d, in terms of the state variable u 0 . The Pareto-frontier can then be determined recursively with the optimal allocation being described by a contract.
Proposition 3.5. V satisfies the following functional equation (FE):
Since the value function V is strictly concave and the constraint set describing the functional equation (FE) Proof. See Appendix.
4 Optimal Contracts
Persistence of Limited Commitment
We can now use the problem (FE) to characterize the optimal contract and, in particular, the decision concerning the use of the punishment technology. Let λ be the multiplier on the promise-keeping constraint and µ i s the multiplier on the ex post incentive compatibility constraint for agent i in state s. Assuming that the function V is differentiable everywhere with respect to u 0 , we obtain the following set of first order conditions which are necessary and sufficient for the optimal contract on (V , V ):
A brief comment about equations (6)- (9) is in order as we omit some of the corresponding Kuhn-Tucker conditions on the decision variables. For u 0 ∈ (V , V ) it is optimal to make current consumption strictly positive for both consumers for all states (i.e.,
, and hence boundary conditions will never bind for c s . Hence, it is never optimal to set d = 1 and we can restrict attention to d ∈ [0, 1). Finally, rearrange equation (8) to obtain an expression for ψ (d) which shows that this expression will always be non-negative. Hence, even if d = 0, equation (8) will hold with equality. With respect to u s the Kuhn-Tucker conditions are standard and, hence, omitted here.
We can reduce equations (6) and (7) to a single equation in the three decision variables given by 
This determines the optimal variation of future promised utility except for cases where the ex post incentive compatibility constraints are binding for both agents simultaneously in some state s. In this case, the direction of the movements for u 0 can be ambiguous.
Based on Lemma 4.1 it is possible to describe at least partially which agent's ex post incentive compatibility constraint is binding: If only one of the agents faces a binding constraint at some income level, he receives more future utility than he was promised initially. Since u * s is increasing in c * s , this agent must receive even more future utility at higher income levels. This is compatible with the first order conditions only if the agent is constrained at higher income levels. Hence, agents tend to be constrained when their income is high and, thus, have a strong reason to choose autarky over staying with the contract. This intuition is formally summarized in the lemma below.
Proof. See Appendix. This theorem makes several important points. First, the agents will never rely exclusively on the technology that provides punishment to deal with limited commitment. Enforcement problems are always mitigated by a combination of using the explicit threat of punishment (d * > 0) and implicit incentives provided through variations in future promised utility (u * s = u 0 ). Hence, any optimal contract will retain the commitment problem to a certain degree and counteract it by the intertemporal allocation of consumption between the agents. In this sense, commitment problems are persistent. 8 Note that assuming ψ (0) = 0 is essential for this result. In the case that ψ (0) > 0, one might not want to use the punishment technology when a first-best allocation is not incentive feasible, but rather rely exclusively on internal incentives by setting u * s = u 0 .
Second, the state variable u 0 will change with the realization of income shocks even though the punishment technology is employed. Thus, the distribution of wealth as summarized by u 0 varies over time and does not remain fixed. This implies that decisions concerning the use of the punishment technology are path dependent and vary over time due to changes in the wealth distribution. Therefore, the choice of enforcement is inherently a dynamic problem and cannot be treated as an ex ante static problem.
Punishment and Inequality
We turn now to the second question of how the level of punishment changes over time as the state variable u 0 evolves endogenously. Since the environment is symmetric with respect to the characteristics of the two agents, it is possible to restrict attention to the case where
. If the first-best allocation for u 0 is incentive feasible, the contract is completely characterized by Theorem 4.3. We therefore turn to the case where the first-best allocation at u 0 is not incentive feasible.
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As inequality increases -i.e., as |u 0 − u| increases -it is more difficult to sustain efficient risk sharing since the outside option of leaving the arrangement becomes more attractive on average. Risk sharing has then to be supported by stronger incentives.
These can be provided in two different ways: One can either increase |u s − u 0 | (i.e., provide more indirect incentives via future promised utility) or one can invest more in the punishment technology. However, using more indirect incentives decreases future risk sharing on average. One should therefore expect that investment in the punishment technology would rise to at least partially counteract the negative effects on risk sharing.
In other words, punishment should behave like a "normal" good in terms of inequality (in symbols, |u 0 − u|) and substitution between the ways to provide incentives should not take place.
Unfortunately, this question is too complex to be analyzed in full generality. We Proof. See Appendix.
When inequality increases, it is optimal to decrease overall consumption and devote more resources to ensure enforcement of the risk sharing arrangement. Even though 10 Even though the value function is not differentiable at u 0 = u if S = 2, none of the results in this section is affected by this non-differentiability. Moreover, if S = 2, u * s (u) = u, which shows that differentiability is necessary for the validity of Theorem 4.3. Corollary 4.6 establishes this result only for the case when some first-best allocation is incentive feasible, numerical solutions described in more detail below confirm this result for the general case.
This result can be interpreted in a slightly different way. Suppose that one of the agents has higher bargaining power than the other. Then this agent has an interest in maintaining her position and is willing to spend more resources on outside enforcement.
This enables her to at least partially lock in the relative position by keeping u s "closer" to u 0 . When the difference between the relative positions (i.e., |u 0 −u|) increases, it is harder to maintain the current position, and more resources are spent on outside enforcement.
Interestingly, however, Theorem 4.3 shows that outside enforcement is always too costly for the agents to maintain a current advantage in their bargaining power over time.
Long-run Implications of Optimal Contracts
After characterizing properties of the optimal contract, the question arises how the relationship between the agents develops in the long run. Of particular interest is how the relative position of the two agents adjusts in the long run and whether convergence to an invariant distribution over the state space occurs. We focus first on the two-state case.
Later, we discuss what assumptions are necessary to derive a slightly weaker result for the case of an arbitrary finite number of states.
Before stating the main result of this section, it is necessary to introduce some notation. The stochastic process {ω t } ∞ t=0 can be defined over the probability space
, where an event is a particular sample path of the process, the σ-algebra Given the optimal contract and an initial condition u 0 , for every sample path ω ∈ Ω ∞ it is possible to construct a sequence {u t (ω; u 0 )} ∞ t=0 of promised future utility levels for agent 2. Set u 1 (ω; u 0 ) = u * s (u 0 ) if s ∈ S is realized in period 0. Define u t (ω; u 0 ) recursively by setting u t (ω; u 0 ) = u * s (u t−1 ) if s ∈ S is realized in period t for all t > 0. Moreover, denote the set of promised utility levels for which some first-best allocations is incentive
. Suppressing the arguments of u t , we can then prove the following result on the long-run behavior of the optimal contract. Theorem 4.7. Let S = 2 and suppose that u * s is non-decreasing.
If there exists a first-best allocation that is incentive feasible, then for any optimal contract, lim t→∞
u t = u F B Π ∞ -a.s. whenever u 0 < u F B and lim t→∞ u t = u F B Π ∞ -a.s. whenever u 0 > u F B .
If there does not exist a first-best allocation that is incentive feasible, then for any
Provided that there are only two states, for any initial condition u 0 the stochastic process for u t converges with probability 1 to a unique point distribution. Hence, the availability of outside enforcement does not prevent the equalization of wealth between the agents over time or, for the case that the set of incentive feasible first-best allocations is nonempty, convergence to the "closest" element of this set.
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It is possible to give a slightly weaker result for the case that there are more than two states and no first-best allocation is incentive feasible. The optimal contract and the exogenous process of shocks define a Markov transition function. Continuity of the policy functions u * s establishes the Feller Property for this transition function. Moreover, the transition function will satisfy a mixing condition whenever the value function V 11 It is straightforward to show that d * being monotonically increasing in wealth inequality is a necessary condition for u * s to be increasing. Moreover, the monotonicity assumption on u * s seems rather weak since numerical solutions given below indicate that these functions are indeed increasing for a wide range of parameterizations. is an increasing function of the state variable u 0 . We defer details of this argument to the appendix.
To summarize our contribution, we have established three important theoretical results. First, commitment problems are persistent and not completely resolved by the use of costly third-party enforcement. Second, more unequally distributed bargaining power leads to greater reliance upon third-party enforcement. Last, the presence of third-party enforcement never prevents adjustments to a long-run, possibly equal, distribution of wealth across agents.
Numerical Solutions
The main analytical results of this section are derived under certain restrictions. We now provide further support for the generality of these results by presenting some numerical solutions for optimal contracts. Before presenting these results, we outline the algorithm used to solve for the Pareto frontier and the optimal contract, and describe how this algorithm can be implemented computationally.
The algorithm is based upon dynamic programming techniques. These methods are generally not applicable when solving incentive constrained problems, since the value function of the problem itself will influence the constraint set directly as can easily be observed from problem (FE). Hence, the constraint set will change with every iteration of the value function when solving the functional equation (FE). More importantly, the domain of the state variables for which the maximization problem is well defined will change with each iteration as well. Rustichini [14] demonstrates that one can modify standard dynamic programming methods in a straightforward way to handle these problems. He shows analytically that one can iterate directly on a guess for the value function in order to obtain convergence to the true value function of the incentive constrained problem. Conditions for this result are that the value function iteration starts with the value function of the unconstrained problem as an initial guess and that one adjusts the domain of the state variables in an appropriate way. Given these conditions, convergence is then monotonic from above to the true solution of the functional equation (FE). The details of the algorithm we employ are as follows:
Step 1: Calculate the initial guess J 0 for the value function V .
Step 2: Adjust the domain D n of the state variable u 0 given the guess J n for the value function V .
Step 3: Solve the static maximization problem for each realization of the state variable u 0 given J n . Use this result to update the guess to J n+1 .
Step 4: If sup u 0 ∈Dn (J n (u 0 ) − J n+1 (u 0 )) > > 0, go back to Step 2.
Step 5: Use J n+1 to calculate policy functions and find the law of motion on D n .
To calculate the initial guess start with the Pareto frontier (which can be calculated analytically in a straightforward manner for any given utility function u) describing the first best solution of the risk sharing problem. Then define a new maximization problem (PRE) by deleting the ex post incentive compatibility constraints for consumer 1 that contain the value function V from problem (FE). Solve (PRE) by iterating over the value function of this problem with the Pareto frontier as the initial guess to obtain the initial guess for Step 1 of the algorithm above. This ensures convergence to the "right" guess to apply the method of Rustichini [14] . changed to β = 0.6, θ = 1, σ = 0.4 and y s ∈ {1.5, 0.5}. For these values, there does not exist a first-best allocation that is incentive feasible. The Pareto-frontier, therefore, shifts inward relative to the value of first-best allocations as shown in Figure 5 .
The enforcement choice depicted in Figure 6 is strictly positive. Furthermore, the policy function d * is increasing in wealth inequality, a result we obtained in our numerical solutions for any parameterization. The non-differentiability of the value function atū for S = 2 causes some numerical error which is reflected in the small difference between the law of motion of both states at u 0 =ū (cf. Figure 7) . Last, we stress that Figures 3 and 7 show that u * s is an increasing function of the state u 0 , a result that can be confirmed in numerical experiments for a wide range of parameters. This gives us confidence that the results concerning the long-run properties of the optimal contract are true quite generally as the assumptions of Theorem 4.7 seem to be satisfied with wide generality.
Concluding Remarks
Our analysis demonstrates that commitment problems persist even though the parties sharing risk have access to costly third-party enforcement. This result is strong in the sense that we impose rather weak restrictions on the cost structure, thereby giving the use of enforcement the best possible chance. More importantly, even though the presence of fixed costs will introduce a barrier to using third-party enforcement, persistence depends only on the fact that costs are increasing in the use of punishments. As long as this is the case, there are always incentives to avoid part of these costs by relying also on intertemporal features of the contract. Since commitment problems become more severe with increasing differences in the relative position of the agents, the monotonicity property of optimal enforcement is not too surprising. However, it is striking that the costs of keeping fixed a specific positive level of inequality always outweigh the existing incentives to do so; the technology is never "abused" to lock in a specific level of inequality.
We have assumed that enforcement cannot depend on the current realization of the income shock. This can be justified along two lines. First, impartial punishment is based on the violation of the contract (i.e., leaving the arrangement) disregarding other circumstances like differences in current income. Second, if punishment depends on the current realization of the shock, the incentives of the two agents are not properly aligned.
Whoever has a high income realization prefers a strictly lower punishment level than the other agent. Hence, communicating the current income distribution to the outside would be difficult if not impossible. This problem does not occur if punishment next period depends only on the new level of promised utility set endogenously by the agents in the previous period. Future work should concentrate on modelling a non-cooperative game between the agents and a third agent providing enforcement. It is then possible to study not only the incentives of the third party, but also difficulties in the communication between agents and the outside party.
By using a dynamic contracting approach for our analysis we are silent about any initial condition that would pin down the dynamic evolution of the long-run relationship.
Since our description of the optimal contract is independent of any initial conditions, the outcome of any ex ante bargaining procedure would simply consist of the optimal contract described here evaluated at an initial condition reflecting the relative bargaining power of the agents. By construction, there would be no incentives for the agents to violate this contract at any later time.
A final remark concerns decentralizing the environment. Optimal contracts could be decentralized as a financial markets equilibrium with complete markets and portfolio constraints. These constraints mimic how stringent the incentive compatibility or participation constraints for the optimal contract are. Since the agents choose the set of feasible allocations in our problem, the value of the portfolio constraints must vary dynamically over time as uncertainty is resolved. The decentralization should reflect the optimal choice of enforcement and, hence, offers a conceptually genuine theory of endogenous portfolio constraints.
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The main difficulty clearly arises from the problem of distributing the enforcement costs among the agents. The requirement here is to construct either a market mechanism or a direct mechanism that distributes the costs without disturbing the properly decentralized financial decisions of the agents.
Appendix A Proof of Lemma 3.2:
, U is compact if and only if U is closed and bounded. Obviously,
is bounded. Let u n be a convergent sequence such that u n ∈ U for all n and denote its limit byû. Then, there is a sequence of allocations (c 2. For i = 1, 2, U i is the projection of U into IR. Hence, U i is compact. By symmetry,
Proof of Proposition 3.3:
13 Alvarez and Jermann [1] suggest a decentralization of an economy with exogenously given participation constraints. Their borrowing constraint are "endogenous" only to the extent that they are not completely arbitrary, but rather determined by the fundamentals of the economy. 
is compact, the constraint set of (UP) is compact and by continuity of the objective function, this problem has a solution in U. Thus, there exists an incentive feasible allocation that attains these utility levels. Hence, the problem (SP)
2. Suppose V is not strictly decreasing over [V min , V max ]. Since V is concave and continuous, V is either constant over [V min , V max ] or constant over a subinterval starting from V min and strictly decreasing over the remainder of the interval. It is therefore sufficient to show that V is strictly decreasing at V aut , which is clearly an element of
Let u 0 = V aut . Suppose first that at the optimal allocation some ex post incentive constraint for agent 2 is not binding in period t = 0. Then, for some s ∈ S,
Hence, we can decrease c 
Suppose now that for the solution to (SP) given V aut , all ex post incentive compatibility constraints bind for agent 2 at t = 0. Since u 0 = V aut , we have
which implies that d 0 = 0. We construct an allocation for some u 0 < V aut that gives agent 1 a utility which is strictly higher than V (V aut ). Define the following two functions for a given s ∈ S and given the optimal allocation:
and 
Hence, there exists an incentive feasible allocation that gives u 0 < V aut to agent 2 and V (V aut ) to agent 1 such that some ex post incentive compatibility constraint for agent ,d 1,s ) . This allocation is clearly incentive feasible. Furthermore, it delivers at least as much utility to both agents as the optimal allocation and strictly more expected utility for one agent.
Hence, (ĉ for all s ∈ S. By the previous claim, for all s ∈ S the continuation allocation is optimal lies; i.e.,
Consider now the contract ({ĉ Proof of Lemma 4.1:
1. Using equation (7), µ i s = 0 for all i implies that −V (u s ) = λ. By the envelope theorem, λ = −V (u 0 ) and the result follows from the fact that V is strictly decreasing.
2. Using the envelope theorem, equation (7) reduces to
Since V is strictly decreasing and strictly concave, u s < u 0 .
3. The proof is analogous to the one given above. 
Therefore, both agents receive higher or equal utility in state s = L than in state s = H.
This cannot be optimal since one can replicate the contract for state s = L in state s = H and make at least some agent better off without making the other worse off. 
which contradicts u 0 <ū.
By incentive feasibility,
both agents receive higher or equal utility in state s = H than in state s = L. This cannot be optimal since one can replicate the contract for state s = H in state s = L and make at least some agent better off without making the other one worse off.
The previous claim implies that µ Suppose not. Then, there existsû 0 <û 0 such thatd <d. By incentive feasibility,
This is a contradiction. 
where γ s denotes the value of the outside option if income is given by y s . Sinceû 0 <ũ 0 , u L ≥û 0 and V is strictly concave,
haveû L >ũ L =ũ 0 . Since the allocation for state s = H is the same forû 0 andũ 0 , it follows thatû 0 >ũ 0 , which is a contradiction.
Proof of Corollary 4.6:
If there exists a first-best allocation that is incentive feasible, d = 0 for some interval Proof of Theorem 4.7: This condition can be interpreted in our context as follows. Suppose that u 0 ∈ {V , V };
i.e., in period t = 0 we have the highest possible degree of inequality. Given Condition B.1, there is a positive probability that the initial inequality between agents is reversed within in a finite number of periods.
Let 
